The Triptychs of Publius

By Publius

Abstract

Practical normativity arises from the recognition of necessity at two levels. The first concerns the internal structure of any possible intentional action: to will a determinate realization coherently is not to will its necessary non-realization. The second concerns the actual nature of the world: natural facts determine what is possible, indispensable, or costly in particular undertakings. The first is per se, universal, and indefeasible; the second is per accidens relative to action as such, and includes conditional necessities as well as defeasible considerations of cost. These principles illuminate pragmatic idealism, Nothing Too Much, and Daoist wuwei.

I. The Fundamental Distinction: Two Kinds of Necessity

Every action is subject to necessity in two distinct respects. First, necessities arise from the internal structure of action itself, independently of which particular end is chosen. Second, necessities arise from the actual nature of the world: its determinate capacities, structures, limits, and relationships. Both levels require the agent to recognize necessity rather than attempt to will away what cannot be otherwise.

Level I — Per se: Recognize the necessity of practical coherence in any possible action.

Level II — Per accidens: Recognize the actuality of natural facts and the extent to which they constrain particular action.

II. First Principles: Practical Non-Contradiction

P1. To will X is to choose to bring about the determinate realization X. Willing differs from merely wishing or desiring. Aristotle’s distinction between wish and choice provides a classical precedent.[1]

P2. An agent cannot coherently will both X and not-X in the same respect and circumstances. The agent may choose either, or reconsider, but cannot coherently maintain both as determinate practical commitments.[2]

P3. Every determinate realization has necessary conditions: if X is to occur, whatever is indispensable for X must obtain.

P4. If C is necessary for X, then X and not-C cannot both be realized. An agent who wills both X and not-C accordingly undertakes incompatible realizations.

P5. Maintaining incompatible practical commitments violates practical non-contradiction. The agent may abandon X, abandon the incompatible commitment, or correct an error; the agent cannot coherently maintain both.

P6. This structure applies to any possible intentional action, regardless of its particular end.

Conclusion 1. Every coherent agent must avoid willing incompatible determinate realizations. This requirement is per se because it arises from the internal structure of willing, universal because it applies to any intentional action, and indefeasible because no circumstance makes contradictory willing coherent.[3] It does not require pursuit of any particular end.

III. Particular Natural Constraints: The Necessity of Actuality

The universal principle does not determine what is possible in any particular situation. For that, the agent must recognize actual conditions.

P7. Every particular action occurs among things with determinate capacities, structures, limits, and relationships. These facts are not created by choice.

P8. Natural facts determine possibilities and necessities. Some conditions are indispensable; others determine relative costs, risks, and efficiencies. A bridge must be structurally sound, although sound designs may differ in expense, appearance, and accessibility.

P9. An agent undertaking X must recognize the extent to which actual conditions constrain X. One cannot make X possible merely by disregarding conditions indispensable to it. Willing X while knowingly willing the absence of such conditions creates incompatible commitments.

P10. Natural conditions establish cost gradients. Other things equal, agents have reason to avoid unnecessary costs, although this preference is defeasible and is not itself deduced from non-contradiction.[4]

P11. Costs may be outweighed by other ends. A more expensive bridge may better serve accessibility; a slower educational method may produce deeper understanding.

Conclusion 2. An agent undertaking a particular realization must attend to actual conditions governing its possibility and success. This is per accidens relative to action as such, because its content depends on particular facts. Conditions necessary for X are conditionally necessary; comparative cost advantages generate defeasible reasons.[5]

IV. The Unity of the Two Levels

Both levels are forms of recognizing necessity. The first concerns what cannot coherently be willed together; the second concerns what cannot actually be realized together, or can be realized only under specified conditions. The first supplies the universal standard; the second supplies the material content needed to apply it.

To will is to choose a determinate realization. Such a realization cannot occur under conditions incompatible with it. Natural facts determine which conditions are compatible. Accordingly, coherent action requires recognizing those facts insofar as they constrain the chosen end.

An agent may unknowingly choose means that defeat an end without knowingly willing a contradiction. Objective incompatibility and conscious irrationality should therefore be distinguished. Once the conflict is recognized, practical coherence calls for revision.[6]

Do not will what necessarily defeats what you will.

V. Pragmatic Idealism: Recognizing the Necessity of Circumstance

Aristotle’s sailors discard cargo in a storm to preserve their ship and lives.[7] Their ideal is to save both ship and cargo, but suppose the circumstances render this impossible. Their feasible alternatives are to discard the cargo and save the ship, or retain the cargo and lose both.

The ideal remains desirable as a standard of evaluation, but no longer available as an object of choice. To insist upon it despite recognizing its impossibility may defeat the very purpose for which it was sought. Pragmatic idealism therefore means recognizing necessity without abandoning ideals. Feasibility does not by itself settle every moral question: rights, duties, and distribution of harms may also matter.[8]

VI. Nothing Too Much and the Dao

Every determinate realization depends upon conditions of quantity, timing, manner, relation, order, and compatibility. Excess, deficiency, mistiming, unsuitable means, or interference can defeat these conditions. Nothing Too Much is therefore not fundamentally a preference for moderate quantities; it is the requirement not to defeat the conditions of what one seeks to realize. Aristotle’s mean relative to us offers a partial analogy.[9]

This also permits a systematic reconstruction of Daoism. Dao is the encompassing Way within which things arise and interact; De concerns their particular powers and capacities; wuwei may be interpreted as action according with conditions of realization rather than defeating them through unnecessary interference; and reversal describes how excessive force can undermine its own purpose. Chapters 30, 36, 48, and 64 of the Dao De Jing are particularly suggestive.[10] This is a philosophical reconstruction, not an assertion that Laozi explicitly argued from practical non-contradiction.

VII. Final Statement

To will something is to choose to bring about its determinate realization. An agent cannot coherently will both the realization and non-realization of the same thing in the same respect. This is practical non-contradiction: a per se, universal, indefeasible requirement of any possible coherent willing.

Every particular realization occurs within determinate natural circumstances, which establish what is possible, necessary, and costly. Recognizing those conditions is required for coherent action in the actual world. This second level is per accidens relative to action as such: some facts establish indispensable conditions; others supply defeasible reasons concerning efficiency and cost.

First, recognize the necessity inherent in the structure of willing. Second, recognize the necessities imposed by the actual nature of things.

The first establishes universal practical coherence. The second determines its particular application. Together they ground Nothing Too Much: Do not will what necessarily defeats what you will. Act in accordance with the conditions of what you seek to realize.

Notes

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III.2–3, 1111b4–1113a14; G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, 2nd ed. (1963); Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (1987).
2. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:417; Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (1996); Thomas E. Hill Jr., “The Hypothetical Imperative,” Philosophical Review 82 (1973): 429–450.
3. John Broome, “Normative Requirements,” Ratio 12 (1999): 398–419; Mark Schroeder, “The Hypothetical Imperative?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 357–372.
4. Kieran Setiya, “Is Efficiency a Vice?,” American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2005): 333–339.
5. Aristotle, Physics II.8–9, 199b34–200b8; Mariska Leunissen, Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of Nature (2010).
6. John Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning (2013); Niko Kolodny, “Why Be Rational?,” Mind 114 (2005): 509–563.
7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III.1, 1110a4–19.
8. Philippa Foot, “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect” (1967); Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Trolley Problem,” Yale Law Journal 94 (1985): 1395–1415; Frances Kamm, Intricate Ethics (2007).
9. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.6, 1106a26–1107a8.
10. Dao De Jing, chapters 30, 36, 48, 64; Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action (2003).

Addendum A: Objections and Replies

1. Does the argument derive an ought from an is?

Reply. The first level identifies a constitutive standard of coherent willing; the second identifies natural facts that constrain the realization of chosen ends. Neither identifies naturalness with moral goodness.

2. Why must an agent satisfy the necessary conditions of a chosen end?

Reply. The agent can abandon the end. What is incoherent is maintaining commitments to the end and to its necessary prevention together.

3. Can an agent knowingly maintain incompatible desires?

Reply. Yes, but desire is not identical to determinate practical choice. The argument concerns willing incompatible realizations, not experiencing conflicting attractions.

4. Does constitutive coherence establish independent normative authority?

Reply. The argument establishes a constitutive standard of coherent willing, not a complete account of all moral reasons. See David Enoch, “Agency, Shmagency,” Philosophical Review 115 (2006): 169–198.

5. Why prefer more efficient means?

Reply. Efficiency is a defeasible comparative reason, not a logical consequence of non-contradiction alone. More costly means may serve other relevant purposes.

6. Does accordance with nature entail that everything natural is morally good?

Reply. No. Natural conditions govern possibility and cost, not the moral worth of every end.

7. What if the agent does not recognize the necessity?

Reply. Objective incompatibility remains, but ignorance need not constitute knowingly contradictory willing. Recognition creates occasion for revision.

8. Is the principle tautological?

Reply. Joint realization of incompatible outcomes is impossible; practical non-contradiction concerns the coherence of choosing them jointly. The latter is a standard for agency, not merely a description of the world.