Moral Relativity Without Moral Relativism

Oliver Whetstone

Abstract

Aristotle observes that the fine and the just exhibit so much variation and instability that they appear to exist by convention rather than nature. This paper argues that the inference from moral variation to conventionalism confuses variability in the application of a principle with variability in the principle itself. An analogy with Galilean mechanics illustrates how invariant laws can generate different outcomes under different initial conditions. Drawing on Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean and the Delphic maxim Mēden agan—Nothing Too Much—I develop an account of moral invariance grounded in constitutive limits. Determinate goods possess conditions of successful realization; actions that negate these conditions become practically self-defeating. Such contradictions may arise per se, through the structure of a policy or end, or per accidens, through a failure to accommodate particular circumstances. Practical wisdom consists partly in recognizing and removing these contradictions while preserving fidelity to the goods at stake. The resulting account explains how moral judgment can be objectively governed yet dynamically responsive to changing circumstances.

I. The Appearance of Moral Relativism

Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics by observing:

Τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή.

“The fine and the just, which political science investigates, exhibit so much variation and instability that they seem to exist only by convention, and not by nature.” (I.3, 1094b14–16; translation mine.)[1]

The concluding inference is the philosophical problem. Because the fine and the just differ across circumstances and appear unstable, they seem to be products of convention rather than nature.

Yet the inference is not necessary. The manifestation of a principle may vary without the principle itself varying. Indeed, fidelity to an invariant principle may require different actions under different circumstances.

Consider the distinction between an invariant physical law and the outcomes it produces. A ball released aboard a ship moving at constant velocity falls vertically relative to the ship, but traces a parabola relative to the shore. The descriptions differ, while the laws governing the motion remain invariant. More generally, the same physical laws produce different outcomes under different initial conditions.

The analogy is not exact. Moral circumstances are not merely coordinate systems, and differences in moral requirements are not simply differences in observation. Rather, the relevant analogy is between invariant laws and their context-dependent realizations.

The proposed moral invariant is the Delphic maxim Μηδὲν ἄγαν (Mēden agan): Nothing Too Much.[2]

Understood properly, this is not a preference for middling quantities. It is the requirement that a good be pursued in accordance with the conditions of its successful realization.

II. The First Principle: Determination and Constitutive Limits

Why should anything have a proper measure?

The answer begins not with an empirical generalization about moderation, but with the conditions of determinate existence.

A determinate thing is what it is by virtue of certain constitutive conditions. A triangle, for example, requires three sides joined in a closed figure. An arrangement that negates those conditions does not preserve the triangle as such.

The argument can be stated directly:

Every conditioned, determinate thing possesses necessary conditions of identity.
Negating a necessary condition is incompatible with preserving the identity it constitutes.
Some relevant possible configurations negate such conditions.
Therefore, a conditioned, determinate thing is not compatible with every possible configuration.

Let (Q) represent the space of relevant possible configurations, and let (I_D) represent those configurations compatible with the identity of a determinate thing (D).

Then:

(I_D=\{q\in Q:D\text{ retains its identity under }q\}.)

If some possible configuration violates a necessary condition of identity, then:

(I_D\subsetneq Q.)

This is the constitutive restriction theorem developed in Nothing Too Much: Constitutive Limits.[3]

The conclusion is modest but fundamental. Determinate identity excludes some configurations. It does not follow that every relevant variable has a finite upper bound, that every good possesses an interior optimum, or that all excess follows an inverted-U curve.

Stronger conclusions require additional premises.

For organized wholes, necessary constituents and relations impose further restrictions. Where multiple positive-measure constituents are necessary, no one constituent may be wholly absent or occupy the entirety of the composition. Where finite resources must satisfy multiple positive minimum requirements, additional quantitative bounds follow.

The underlying principle is that a whole cannot be preserved by destroying the conditions that constitute it.

A parallel principle applies to functional goods. Where successful realization of a good depends on necessary conditions, action that negates those conditions cannot successfully realize that good.

This yields the practical form of Nothing Too Much:

No good can be successfully realized through a mode of pursuit that negates the necessary conditions of its realization.

The limit is therefore intrinsic to the good’s realization, rather than imposed arbitrarily from outside.

This does not imply that every increase in a good eventually becomes harmful. It implies that the rational pursuit of a conditioned good must respect its constitutive conditions.

III. The Intrinsic Measure of the Good

Consider wealth.

Wealth is ordinarily desirable because it enables security, freedom, provision, and worthwhile activity. Yet the pursuit of wealth can undermine these goods when it destroys the agent’s health, relationships, freedom, or capacity to enjoy what has been acquired.

In such a case, the agent increases possession of the instrument while diminishing realization of the good for which the instrument was sought.

The contradiction is not that wealth is bad, nor that a particular quantity is universally excessive. It is that the manner of pursuit defeats the end that gives the pursuit its rationale.

The same structure can arise in physical training. Exercise ordinarily improves strength and health, but training beyond the body’s capacity for recovery can diminish performance and damage the capacities it was intended to improve.

In both cases, excess is relational rather than merely quantitative.

The relevant question is not simply how much of something an agent possesses or performs, but whether the action preserves the conditions of the good it intends to realize.

This distinction connects to Completing Rational Choice, which argues that coherence in preference ordering does not itself establish the rational admissibility of the ends being pursued.[4]

A candidate final end must withstand a further test: can it serve as a coherent governing principle of its own pursuit?

If maximizing an instrumental good systematically undermines the value that makes it worth pursuing, that good cannot by itself supply a complete principle of maximization.

Some goods require a measure; a candidate ultimate good must be capable of supplying or incorporating the measure governing its own realization.

This is recursive coherence. A principle of action must remain coherent not merely in its immediate application but under the consequences of its continued or generalized pursuit.

Nothing Too Much expresses the corresponding constitutive requirement: pursuit must remain within the conditions of successful realization.

The result is not a universal instruction to maximize less. It is a prohibition against self-defeating maximization.

IV. Diaphora: The Mean Relative to Us

Aristotle’s example of Milo the wrestler illustrates how invariant standards generate different appropriate actions.

In Nicomachean Ethics II.6, Aristotle distinguishes the arithmetic mean from the mean relative to us. Six is the arithmetic mean between two and ten, but six units of food may be too little for Milo and too much for a beginner.[5]

The appropriate quantity depends on the recipient’s constitution, capacities, and needs.

This is the first dimension of ethical variation: diaphora, or difference.

Different agents require different actions because their relevant circumstances differ.

Yet the underlying principle need not vary. In each case, the appropriate amount is that which serves the recipient’s genuine nutritional requirements without defeating them.

To prescribe identical quantities to Milo and the beginner would not preserve ethical consistency. It would disregard the very conditions that make the prescription appropriate.

The invariant is therefore not the quantity consumed, but the relation between consumption, constitution, and the good of nourishment.

Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is consequently not a doctrine of arithmetic moderation. The virtuous mean is relative to us, determined by reason and by the judgment of the practically wise person.[6]

The appropriate response depends on the agent, object, time, purpose, and manner of action.

This is an objective but relational standard.

V. Planē: The Fluctuation of Circumstances

The second dimension of ethical variation concerns changing circumstances.

Even where the agent remains the same, the conditions governing successful action may change over time.

Aristotle’s discussion of throwing cargo overboard during a storm supplies an example.[7]

Ordinarily, preserving valuable cargo is prudent. During a sufficiently dangerous storm, however, preserving it may threaten the ship and its passengers. Throwing it overboard may then become the best available action.

Once the danger has passed, the justification disappears.

The same action can therefore be appropriate at one moment and inappropriate at another, not because the underlying good has changed, but because the conditions of its realization have changed.

This illustrates planē, understood here as fluctuation or instability in practical circumstances.[8]

The distinction between diaphora and planē is an analytical reconstruction rather than a technical distinction explicitly drawn by Aristotle. The former emphasizes differences between situations; the latter emphasizes their change over time.

Both illustrate the same principle: appropriate action must remain proportionate to the actual conditions under which goods can be realized.

This is also the central insight of Pragmatic Idealism.

We must distinguish what is possible in principle (Can₁) from what is genuinely feasible under actual circumstances (Can₂).

Saving the ship, its passengers, and all its cargo may be the preferable outcome considered abstractly. But during a sufficiently severe storm, it may no longer be feasible.

Practical wisdom must therefore identify the best genuinely available realization of the relevant goods.

The ideal is not abandoned. Its practical realization is adjusted to the circumstances.

VI. Two Forms of Practical Contradiction

The constitutive account of the good allows us to distinguish two kinds of practical contradiction.

A practical contradiction occurs when an action or policy defeats a necessary condition of the good it is intended to realize, under a specification of the end that makes the relevant dependency explicit.

Practical Contradiction Per Se

A practical contradiction is per se when the action or governing policy defeats a necessary condition of its own intended success by virtue of its structure.

Consider a policy that seeks to secure the benefits of universal trust while systematically destroying the conditions that sustain that trust.

Such a policy is self-defeating because its generalized operation undermines a necessary condition of the good it purports to realize.

The contradiction lies in the structure of the governing policy, rather than merely in an unfortunate outcome.

This is related to, but not identical with, Kantian contradictions of universalization.[9]

The relevant question is whether the policy remains coherent under the conditions generated by its own operation.

Practical Contradiction Per Accidens

A practical contradiction is per accidens when an action that is otherwise capable of realizing its intended end becomes self-defeating under particular circumstances.

Preserving cargo is ordinarily consistent with the good of safe transportation. But preserving it during a sufficiently dangerous storm may destroy the ship, the cargo, and its passengers.

The contradiction arises from the relationship between the action and the circumstances.

The same action need not be self-defeating in every situation. It becomes so because the agent fails to accommodate the actual conditions of successful realization.

These categories concern the structure of practical failure, not merely the occurrence of an undesirable outcome. An unforeseeable accident need not establish irrationality. Culpable practical contradiction requires attention to what the agent knew or could reasonably have understood.

Nor is every failure of an intended end a contradiction. An action can be rationally chosen under uncertainty and nevertheless fail.

The relevant defect is an avoidable or structurally embedded negation of the conditions necessary for the intended good.

Both forms of contradiction are violations of Nothing Too Much, understood as constitutive coherence.

In the first, the governing policy is structurally self-defeating. In the second, the agent’s conduct is improperly calibrated to the actual situation.

VII. Moral Invariance Without Behavioral Uniformity

We can now return to Aristotle’s opening observation.

The fine and the just exhibit diaphora kai planē: difference and instability.

Their manifestations vary across agents, and their practical requirements change with circumstances.

To an observer who does not understand the principles governing these variations, the differences may appear arbitrary.

This can encourage an inference to moral conventionalism: different communities act differently, so their moral standards must be products of convention rather than nature.

But the inference is invalid.

The same invariant principle can generate different appropriate actions under different conditions.

Conversely, the same outward action may have different moral significance under different circumstances.

The distinction is between behavioral uniformity and normative invariance.

Behavioral uniformity is neither necessary nor sufficient for normative invariance.

Indeed, a person who refuses to change conduct when morally relevant circumstances change may violate the very principle the person believes is being preserved.

This account is supported by Aristotle’s discussion of natural justice in Nicomachean Ethics V.7, where he acknowledges that even what is natural may admit of change among human beings.[10]

The argument does not establish moral realism merely by observing variation. Rather, it shows that variation is not itself evidence against moral realism.

Sophisticated moral relativists may offer independent arguments for the conventional constitution of moral standards.[11] Those arguments require separate consideration.

The narrower conclusion is sufficient here: observed moral diversity does not entail the absence of invariant moral principles.

VIII. Practical Wisdom as Dynamic Coherence

The preceding argument connects the Aristotelian mean to a negative account of wisdom.

Intentional action aims at an apparent good. Yet finite agents may misunderstand their ends, misjudge their circumstances, or choose means that defeat the goods they intend to realize.

Wisdom consists partly in the progressive recognition and removal of these practical contradictions.

The first requirement is constitutive coherence: the agent must not pursue a good through means that negate its necessary conditions.

The second is contextual calibration: the agent must recognize how those conditions vary across persons and circumstances.

The third is recursive coherence: the agent’s governing ends and policies must remain viable under their own continued application.

These requirements are related but distinct.

Constitutive coherence identifies the conditions of successful realization.

Contextual calibration determines their practical significance under actual circumstances.

Recursive coherence tests whether governing ends and policies remain rationally admissible when pursued as general standards.

Together, they supply a framework for understanding phronēsis as the capacity to realize goods without systematically defeating them.[12]

This account does not reduce justice, virtue, or goodness to instrumental efficiency. The ends themselves remain subject to rational evaluation, and the agency and legitimate claims of others impose conditions that cannot be disregarded simply because doing so would advance an individual’s immediate purposes.[13]

The removal of practical contradiction is therefore a necessary discipline of practical wisdom, not an independently complete catalogue of moral obligations.

IX. Conclusion: The Invariance of Proportion

Aristotle’s observation that the fine and the just exhibit difference and instability presents an apparent challenge to natural morality.

But variability in moral requirements does not entail variability in moral principles.

The Galilean analogy illustrates the distinction between invariant laws and the different outcomes they generate under different conditions.

Aristotle’s examples of Milo and the storm demonstrate its practical significance. Different constitutions require different quantities; changing circumstances require different actions.

The principle governing these differences is appropriate proportion.

The first-principles argument for constitutive limits gives this principle a foundation. Determinate goods have conditions of successful realization, and action that negates those conditions cannot realize those goods successfully.

Nothing Too Much is therefore not an arbitrary preference for moderation. It expresses a requirement of constitutive coherence.

Practical contradictions arise when action defeats the goods it purports to realize, whether structurally (per se) or through a failure of contextual judgment (per accidens).

Practical wisdom consists partly in recognizing and removing these contradictions as circumstances change.

The resulting principle is simple:

Moral constancy may require behavioral change, while behavioral constancy may constitute moral inconsistency.

The invariant is not a fixed quantity, behavior, or outcome. It is the requirement that action remain proportionate to the constitutive conditions of the goods it seeks to realize.

This is moral relativity without moral relativism.

Notes

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.3, 1094b14–19. The final clause, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή, is essential: the variation makes the fine and just appear conventional rather than natural. Aristotle’s immediate response concerns the degree of precision appropriate to political science, not a complete refutation of conventionalism.

2. The Delphic maxim Μηδὲν ἄγαν is associated with the Seven Sages; see Plato, Protagoras 343a–b. Compare Plato, Statesman 283c–285c, on measurement relative to what is fitting, and Philebus 64d–65a, on measure, proportion, and goodness. The constitutive interpretation developed here is not presented as Aristotle’s own explicit formulation.

3. Oliver Whetstone, Nothing Too Much: Determination, Constitutive Limits, and the Foundations of Proper Measure, manuscript. The constitutive restriction theorem establishes a proper subset of identity-compatible configurations. It does not, without additional premises, establish numerical upper bounds or a unique optimum. The manuscript further distinguishes identity, viability, and successful functioning.

4. Oliver Whetstone, Completing Rational Choice: Recursive Coherence and the Logical Structure of Final Ends, manuscript. Recursive coherence is proposed as a necessary, not sufficient, condition of a candidate final end’s rational admissibility. The distinction between first-order goods and regulative goods explains why some goods require an external measure while others may supply an internally coherent standard.

5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.6, 1106a26–b7. Aristotle distinguishes the arithmetic mean from the mean relative to us, using Milo and the beginner to illustrate why identical quantities may be excessive or deficient for different recipients.

6. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.6, 1106b18–1107a2. The virtuous mean concerns the appropriate time, object, person, end, and manner, as determined by reason. Aristotle also maintains that some actions admit of no virtuous mean, 1107a8–17. This prevents the doctrine from becoming a universal justification of compromise.

7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III.1, 1110a4–19. The storm example concerns mixed actions and their choiceworthiness under particular circumstances. Compare III.3, 1112a18–1113a14, on deliberation concerning what is within our power.

8. The distinction between diaphora as difference across contexts and planē as temporal instability is an interpretive reconstruction. The Greek terms do not independently establish this technical division. Aristotle’s wider treatment of practical particulars and variability supplies its philosophical justification.

9. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:421–424. The distinction between contradiction per se and per accidens is not identical to Kant’s contradiction in conception and contradiction in will. Compare Whetstone, Completing Rational Choice, on recursive self-defeat and the conditions of final-end admissibility.

10. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V.7, 1134b18–1135a5. Aristotle explicitly recognizes change even in natural justice among human beings. His analogy of the naturally stronger right hand, which may nevertheless become ambidextrous, provides a significant precedent for distinguishing natural standards from invariant manifestations.

11. Gilbert Harman, “Moral Relativism Defended,” The Philosophical Review 84, no. 1 (1975): 3–22; David B. Wong, Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism (Oxford University Press, 2006). These works develop forms of relativism that cannot be refuted merely by showing that moral variation is consistent with invariant principles.

12. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.7–8, especially 1141b14–22, on practical wisdom’s concern with particulars; VI.12–13, especially 1144a7–9 and 1144b30–1145a2, on the relationship between cleverness, virtue, and practical wisdom. Compare Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford University Press, 1991), and John McDowell, “Virtue and Reason,” The Monist 62, no. 3 (1979): 331–350.

13. Oliver Whetstone, Wisdom as the Absence of Practical Contradiction, manuscript. The distinction between apparent and genuine goods is necessary to prevent coherence from collapsing into the efficient pursuit of arbitrary ends. Compare Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.12–13, and Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford University Press, 2004), for a contrasting account of context-sensitive moral judgment that challenges the explanatory sufficiency of invariant principles.